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Background & Purpose: This article summarizes and adds to 
the tools and infrastructure that the author has developed to 
hold donors and NGOs in international development to their 
own international, legal and professional standards, following 
a call in 2008 for organizations to find objective ways to hold 
those organizations to compliance with international law and 
professional principles. 
 
Setting: Global. 
 
Intervention: Not applicable. 
 
Research Design:  The article presents 12 indicator tools (in 
the form of legal elements tests) recently published 
elsewhere and a new litmus test tool presented here for the 
first time for quick evaluations of projects using an inductive 
approach (looking at project logic), explaining how these tools 
relate to each other and how they can be used together.  
 
After introducing these indicators, the piece then compiles 
and summarizes the results for several types of organizations 
to reveal an overall picture of which donors and NGOs are 
failing, which are succeeding, and what this now objectively 
verifies is happening in the world of international 
development. 
 
Data Collection and Analysis: Not applicable. 
 
Findings: The piece offers some reflections on the world that 
we live in where international standards and universal 
principles are not applied, where legal codifications for 
international development are not enforced, and where 
current international development approaches are leading to 
unsustainability, conflict, and homogenization (suppression 
of human diversity and adaptation) that the standards were 
designed to help avoid. The author’s approaches, overall, 
offer the larger blueprint for an infrastructure of 
“development” work to promote universal legal principles, as 
well as a larger set of reforms for changes in social and 
political institutions and systems in the developed world for 
making these changes a reality. 
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Introduction 
 
In early 2008 in an online publication called Policy 
Innovations, I called on professional colleagues and 
citizens in both wealthy and developing nations 
that are recipients of aid to join in forming a new 
type of non-governmental organization for the 
express purpose of holding international donors 
and NGOs accountable to international laws and 
professional standards in “development”  (Lempert, 
2008). I offered personal observations, expressing 
the views of colleagues and recipients in countries 
throughout the world, of the skewed incentives, the 
lack of professionalism, and the shocking amount 
of corruption, mismanagement and abuse in 
development projects, resulting in impacts that 
were in reverse of stated claims and goals for 
sustainable development and human adaptation 
and progress. Though I pointed out several of the 
areas in which these organizations could be held to 
laws and standards, I did not outline the specific 
legal and professional tools that could be used to 
fulfill the mission of these organizations by 
enabling them to objectively measure compliance 
and performance of donors and NGOs. Indeed, few 
existed. I simply noted that they could be developed 
and that there was an urgent need for them.  
In the several months following publication of 
that article, I went forward to invent the 
infrastructure for this monitoring in the form of 12 
essential indicators to measure compliance and to 
hold these organizations accountable to 
international legal agreements and professional 
standards. In a separate article that is now 
published in an international law journal (Lempert, 
2018a), I have shown how these indicators form the 
elements of enforceable law and have organized 
them as a “treatise” or “codification” of 
“international development law” based on the laws 
and treaties signed by nearly the entire community 
of nations. This work complements my other 
previous efforts for the certification of 
organizations and consultants on the basis of their 
adherence to ethical codes and standards in ways 
that would protect the public in both donor and 
recipient countries where interventions occur.  
In this article, I offer an additional indicator 
that can be used as a quick accountability “litmus 
test” of any new development intervention as well 
as of donor and implementing organizations (based 
on their stated missions).  This uses an inductive 
approach to test the internal logic of a project 
intervention or implementation agency, as a 
preliminary to the professional measures of impact 
in specific categories (deductively) in comparison 
with established standards.  
While the approach in “critical development 
studies” and among development professionals 
generally goes only as far as offering a set of 
prescriptions or ideas and calls for action, and 
voicing opinions noting problems, my approach has 
been to provide the basis for enforceable legal 
accountability. In addition to developing a set of key 
indicators that are based on international laws and 
agreed professional standards, I have also tested 
these scoring indicators on several organizations, 
demonstrating how the indicators can be used. 
Moreover, I have subjected each of these 
accountability indicators to rigorous professional 
review by experts in the specific fields of the 
indicators to assure that they meet the objective 
standards of the profession and meet the criteria for 
scientific, neutral tools.  
In short, development professionals and the 
general public in both donor and recipient 
countries now have the objective tools and 
infrastructure to hold donors and NGOs in 
international development to their own standards 
in an easy and effective way. These tools are the 
basic and key indicators of fulfillment of the 
missions of international “development” (as 
opposed to “relief” or “charity” or “emergency 
assistance”) as defined in international treaties. 
The only similar initiative, that of DARA 
International in Spain, is developing quantitative 
standards to measure the achievements of relief 
agencies, but those are more nuts-and-bolts 
technical measures of cost-effectiveness rather than 
a test of consistency of organizational mission, and 
of work in the development side of assistance as 
different from relief. That makes this set of tools the 
one professionally reviewed set of “development” 
standards, filling a special niche in the area of 
international development law and accountability.  
After introducing these indicators below, the 
piece then compiles and summarizes the results for 
several types of organizations to reveal an overall 
picture of which donors and NGOs are failing, 
which are succeeding, and what this now 
objectively verifies is happening in the world of 
international development. The piece then offers 
some reflections on the world that we live in where 
international standards and universal principles 
are not applied, where legal codifications for 
international development are not enforced, and 
where current international development 
approaches are leading to the very unsustainability, 
conflict, and homogenization (suppression of 
human diversity and adaptation) that the standards 
were designed to help avoid. My approaches, 
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overall, offer the larger blueprint for an 
infrastructure of “development” work to promote 
universal legal principles, as well as a larger set of 
reforms for changes in social and political 
institutions and systems in the developed world for 
making these changes a reality.  
 
The Essential (Categorical) Indicator 
Tools and Where to Find Them 
 
While development professionals have long sought 
tools to measure economic or professional impacts 
of particular interventions, what has long been 
lacking is a basic set of measures to assure that 
development interventions are actually meeting the 
requirements of international law and of the 
profession for “development.”  In recent months, I 
have invented twelve basic indicators that start with 
agreed international principles and scientific 
professional standards for achieving results in 
“development”. I then tested projects and 
organizations against a list of requirements in each 
area to indicate where they are omitting, deviating 
from, or evading and twisting the established 
standards.  This approach to compliance is 
deductive and simple.  It starts with the established 
laws, principles or professional requirements and 
holds projects and actors to those ideals to see 
where they are succeeding or failing. 
 These tools, presented below, focus on twelve 
different performance categories as well as on 
overall organizational administration of projects by 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and on 
whether the activity of the NGO is consistent with 
the role of a non-governmental organization (a 
thirteenth indicator).  One compound indicator 
that can be applied to government or the NGO 
sector applies simply to project management and 
focuses on evaluation of projects, testing the 
institutional capacity and infrastructure of 
organizations in setting out and achieving results 
(whether the overall management systems in the 
“development organization” assure that the system 
itself is upholding the key criteria of accountability, 
principles of management control, and 
professionalism in its operations).  Along with this 
is a “litmus test” offered in this article for quick 
examination of project design, that is an overall test 
of the framework for interventions.  
 Four of these indicators are designed to 
measure whether organizations even uphold the 
key missions of development:  the basic test of 
whether an organization is actually doing 
“development” at all, as defined by the 
international community, whether it is doing 
“sustainable development” that meets the 
definition established by the world community (in 
1992), whether it is doing “poverty reduction” (a 
pre-requisite to “development”) and whether it 
meets the key criteria of development that it assure 
the “independence” of the recipient to maintain its 
systems without continued “dependence” on the 
donor.  These indicators include the two types of 
sustainability that are key -- sustainable 
development and sustainability/independence of 
the recipient – rather than the often-misused 
measure of whether project benefits, whatever their 
purpose, are sustainable/long lasting.   
 Two indicators focuses on the mechanisms for 
implementing these interventions, including the set 
of documents used to set the agenda in recipient 
countries (action plans and legal documents) along 
with one of the major forms of development 
assistance – the key input/modality of 
development; “capacity building”.  The 
examination of agenda setting and capacity 
building tests whether development is being 
distorted by the use of tools that have full 
professional expectations in their use.   
 Several sector applications deal with areas 
seemingly difficult to measure such as democracy 
and rights, as well as market interventions.  An 
eighth indicator is in an area where there is an 
agreed mission that is central not only to 
development but to any relationship in the 
international system.  It is in one of the areas that is 
said to be non-quantifiable; that of democracy 
building; the protection and promotion of 
“democracy” as understood universally in treaties 
of the world community, in actions within the 
recipient cultures and communities.  The ninth 
indicator combines the mission of democracy as 
defined by international laws, with the 
tool/modality of education, in the specific area of 
human rights.  This is another area deemed “too 
difficult” or “too qualitative” to measure, but where 
the indicator is proof that the validity and quality of 
even qualitative interventions can be effectively 
scored and evaluated in terms of compliance with 
universal principles and with professional 
standards.  A tenth indicator, on gender 
mainstreaming and equity, looks at a specific area 
of rights and tests whether gender projects actually 
seek to achieve equality in a way that is consistent 
with other international rights goals and 
development frameworks.  An eleventh indicator 
also looks at a category of democracy and 
governance that is a growing area of interventions; 
that of “decentralization.”  The final indicator 
examines an emerging category of development 
interventions that is increasingly taking over the 
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development portfolio; that of market-type 
interventions aimed at either copying standard 
business practices and models (credit and lending 
institutions, productivity and value chains) or in 
building or transforming entire industries or parts 
of an economy for the purposes of “income 
generation” and “productivity.” 
 These indicators, where they can be found in 
the public domain (all placed accessibly on the 
Internet), and a brief overview of what they 
revealed is as follows: 
 
The Compound Indicator:  Management 
Oversight 
 
Evaluation Systems (basic management 
structures in place for all interventions). The 
overall test of whether development organizations 
even have the ability to practice what they preach is 
whether they apply the basic core of 
professionalism, oversight, accountability, 
transparency, and efficiency in the use of funds. 
Note that this is the toughest indicator to use. The 
measures that are used in this indicator come out of 
the literature on business, management, 
accounting, law and policy.  It is also mostly geared 
to large organizations since small organizations do 
not have the resources for professionalization in so 
many areas.  But the basic concepts of 
measurements and objectivity as well as oversight 
by recipient and funding beneficiaries are easy to 
understand and too often violated.  What this 
indicator reveals is that not only are government 
agencies in the development field unaccountable, 
but they actually appear to be corrupted by design, 
with the subversion of ombudsperson systems, 
anti-fraud units, and reviews so as to ensure a 
short-circuiting of any oversight and monitoring 
that hobbles the ability of development assistance 
to achieve results.  Systems appear to be designed 
to insulate bureaucrats, increase bureaucratic 
discretion, cover up errors, hide information, and 
serve as an advertisement for additional funds 
rather than to assure good governance and results.  
This indicator was refereed by a leading journal in 
evaluation methodology (Lempert, 2009b). 
 
Four Key Development Tests 
 
Development. Though international “development” 
agencies, international “development” banks, and 
multi-lateral organizations like the United Nations 
system claim to be doing things like promoting the 
Millennium “Development” Goals, the reality is 
that none of them are even starting to fulfill the 
mission of “development” that has been established 
and agreed upon in the most basic international 
treaties.  Instead of promoting the highest 
aspirations of humanity, international 
organizations are promoting the lowest, simply 
treating humans as animals to temporarily meet 
their basic needs without individual personality 
development or cultural development (Lempert, 
2014b). 
 
Sustainable Development. This indicator offers the 
essential test of an organization’s mission and 
whether it is actually doing development or 
something else.  This is also the quickest and easiest 
indicator to use.  The standards come from the Rio 
Declaration and professional definitions from 
ecology, anthropology, and law or sustainability 
and survival of cultures and eco-systems.  They also 
incorporate business principles that any business 
would use to measure value – increase or 
maintenance of assets and on a per capita basis, 
rather than on sales or profits, as those figures do 
not measure wealth.  This is the major failing and 
hypocrisy of development actors.  The standards 
say one thing but the cultural legacies of 
colonialism and profiteering (or plundering) say 
another.  This indicator, developed jointly with an 
expert in environmental policy, was peer-reviewed 
by a journal setting standards for sustainable 
development (Lempert & Nguyen, 2008).  
Recently, to account for the fact that countries and 
communities can no longer act autonomously but 
are embedded in the global context and its 
influences on climate, war, disease, and risk 
management, all of which can effect sustainable 
development, the authors have supplemented this 
indicator with a second indicator (Lempert & 
Nguyen, 2017).  This indicator of eight elements, 
also reviewed in a journal of sustainability, 
identifies the external factors required for planning 
sustainable development in the local context. 
 
Poverty Reduction. A prerequisite to 
“development” is the achievement of long-term, 
sustainable absolute poverty reduction, while 
overlapping with “development” are the goals of 
eliminating relative poverty by assuring equality of 
cultures (not economic equality but rights equality 
to maintain their integrity) and individual equality 
through rights protections within the context of 
appropriate distributions and opportunities in each 
culture.  The indicator distinguishes between “aid” 
under the name of “poverty reduction” that is not 
intended to create sustainability, long-term poverty 
reduction, or equity, at all, but is designed to treat 
symptoms, absorb cultures, and create neo-
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dependency in a global system where the poor are 
forced to compete against each other everywhere 
(most current international interventions) and aid 
that focuses on root causes of imbalance and 
inequity with a focus on cultural protection and 
institutional change (Lempert, 2015a). 
 
Dependency. This indicator offers the corollary to 
sustainability measures. The measures are easy to 
understand since they are analogous to that of child 
rearing and development; whether development 
leads to a strong, independent and self-sustaining 
system or whether it builds a hierarchical and 
dependent relationship with the donors.  This 
indicator also offers a test of the theories of 
“dependency” that claimed that the world system 
was not developing independent and diverse 
cultures and countries but rather a mechanism for 
control and weakening of the independent, 
sustainable systems, both as a whole and in the 
institutional components that received “assistance” 
from wealthier countries.  Unless a developed 
country is in need of a strong ally, “development” 
funds appear to be designed to weaken 
sustainability and to make weaker countries 
dependent rather than potential competitors.  This 
indicator was reviewed by a journal specializing in 
applications of international law (Lempert, 2009a). 
 
Implementation Mechanisms 
 
Agenda Setting. This indicator measures whether 
implementation-agenda setting activities and their 
outputs – “action plans”, international 
declarations, “master plans”, “country plans”, 
“country strategies”, “legal frameworks”, and other 
documents commonly generated in international 
“aid” interventions -- meet professional and 
development standards for truly self-activating, 
feasible plans.  It distinguishes between agenda 
setting by donors as a means of promoting their 
own agendas, public relations, and fundraising 
strategies and those that are truly professional 
strategic documents with accountability to 
beneficiaries and direct responsiveness to their 
interests.  It helps to expose plans that are little 
indication of “action” or “commitment” and are an 
abuse of processes and a corruption of 
professionalism by donors and in recipient 
countries (Lempert, 2014a).  
 
Capacity Building. This indicator scores the 
development modality that has become the major 
input in the global knowledge economy but that is 
poorly defined; building the “capacity” of systems 
in developing countries so they can be self-
sustaining.  What the indicator reveals when tested 
on several “development” organizations, is that 
rather than build capacity, the overall thrust is 
actually to prolong incapacity as a way to ensure 
dependency, frustrating the development of 
effective management and training systems, or of 
an educated, skilled public.  Capacity building is 
largely used to transfer funds for the purchase of 
government bureaucrats or for the use of 
dependent civil society organizations to serve the 
interests of donor countries.  This indicator was 
peer reviewed by a journal in public administration 
and economics (Lempert, 2015b). 
 
Sector Applications, Seemingly Difficult to 
Measure (Democracy, Rights, Market 
Interventions) 
 
Democratization. Like the indicators used for 
sustainable development and dependency, this is 
also a legal test of compliance with universally 
agreed standards – in this case, for democratization 
-- as established in several international treaties, 
using the treaties rather than any specific country 
interpretations of inputs as the true international 
measure of compliance.  Though political scientists 
have been stymied at how to measure whether 
countries are democratic, this indicator offers a 
simple way to test whether interventions are 
actually designed to move countries or cultures 
towards those definitions of democracy as defined 
by the world system.  The key measure here is the 
change in power relations in ways that protect the 
free choice of communities and individuals, not 
whether systems all move to one type.  The results 
of this indicator show that organizations geared 
towards empowerment understand and promote 
the standard while most major international 
organizations actually undermine democratic goals 
to extend their own influence.  This indicator was 
reviewed by specialists in law and governance 
(Lempert, 2011). 
 
Human Rights Promotion through Education. This 
indicator demonstrates the impact measurement of 
a combined type of input (in this case, education) 
and an outcome (rights promotion).  Inputs – 
whether they be education or social marketing 
campaigns or other behavior change approaches – 
certainly are measured by professionals in the 
business sector and these measures can be applied 
in the public sector combined with public missions 
to test compliance and performance.  The indicator 
unmasks those organizations that simply repeat 
slogans but hide other agendas that actually thwart 
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international missions on the pretext that outcomes 
cannot be measured.  This indicator was peer 
reviewed by the leading journal in applications of 
human rights and democratic education (Lempert, 
2010a). 
 
Gender Mainstreaming and Equality. This 
indicator focuses on a specific area of rights and 
tests whether gender projects actually seek to 
achieve equality in a way that is consistent with 
other international rights goals and development 
frameworks.  The indicator distinguishes between 
approaches that are designed to either promote one 
gender at the expense of the other (including 
projects that only symbolically promote women’s 
rights while actually undermining them) or that 
seek to transform cultures for a specific 
international agenda, and projects that actually 
seek to build sustainable, peaceful societies in 
which both genders balance their roles and benefit 
from greater opportunities.  The indicator reveals 
that most current approaches to gender outside of 
industrial societies are actually undermining those 
societies and long-term prospects for gender equity 
by failing to apply principles of gender 
mainstreaming.  The indicator is tested directly on 
UNIFEM, the United Nations Development Fund 
for Women.  The indicator was peer reviewed by a 
journal on human rights (Lempert, 2016a). 
 
Decentralization. This indicator focuses on a 
specific area of governance that has been promoted 
by the international community in an attempt to 
improve accountability and responsiveness but that 
has lost site of development and sustainability 
objectives.  The indicator reveals that rather than 
promote democratic oversight and cultural 
sustainability within eco-systems, the approach has 
been used for top-down administration and for 
manipulating governmental agendas by 
international organizations,  while also weakening 
the ability of local constituencies to assert 
regulatory control and assure accountability of 
international private and public organizations and 
foreign governments (Lempert, 2016b). 
 
Income Generation and Sustainable Business and 
Market Intervention Projects. This indicator 
demonstrates how to measure the impact of several 
kinds of market interventions that are usually 
justified in terms of “income generation” or 
“productivity.”  Inputs ranging from small business 
training and support and small credit projects to 
trade promotion, privatization, and value chain 
analysis, can be subject to professional standards in 
two categories:  whether they represent an 
appropriate government function that offers public 
safeguards in the context of sustainable 
development AND whether they meet professional 
standards of business for an intervention that 
addresses a market imperfection and correctly 
addresses the services and institutions that need to 
be repaired, as well as whether it effectively 
promotes sustainable, competitive businesses and 
industries.  The indicator unmasks those 
organizations that simply throw money at an 
ideology – that of the “market” – as well as those 
that are acting to promote modern forms of 
predatory colonial businesses, stealing resources, 
breaking local economies, and putting people to 
work producing for foreign interests, rather than 
actually correcting market failures and promoting 
sustainable local economies.  This indicator was 
peer reviewed by an international journal on 
ecomonocs and society (Lempert, 2012). 
 The same approach that applies for income 
generation projects, in general, can also be targeted 
with specialized indicators to specific sectors.  An 
example of an eight-element indicator in the fast-
growing tourism sector also demonstrates how 
government interventions in tourism can be held 
accountable to standards for cultural, 
environmental, and heritage protection (the keys of 
“sustainable tourism”) to distinguish those that 
follow international law and standards from those 
that promote colonial exploitation of peoples and 
environments.  This indicator was peer reviewed by 
a leading journal in tourism research (Lempert, 
2016d). 
 
A Five-Minute “Litmus” Test of 
Development Projects:  An Inductive 
Test of Project Logic and Practices 
 
While the tools above can be used for detailed 
analysis of projects in the key areas of development, 
it is also possible to directly and quickly 
troubleshoot any development project.  A trained 
development professional understanding the 
professional standards and principles of 
development as well as the logic of development 
intervention can actually read a standard project 
document and determine in the scope of five 
minutes whether or not that projected is a 
worthwhile expenditure of funds or is a corrupted 
misuse of donor money for other ends.  While it 
may seem like it would take a career of experience 
to develop the skill of screening projects, in fact it is 
possible to extract the key questions that any 
development expert should ask in scanning a 
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project proposal, and to offer them as a checklist for 
anyone to use. 
 The typical failures that the indicators, above, 
help to detect and score in detail are how projects 
that claim to be doing “sustainable development,” 
promoting “democracy,” building “capacity” or 
promoting “independence” are actually using funds 
to buy off a Ministry (or prepare for future favors),   
groom future elites, buy influence in a country 
through foreign-supported NGOs, or offer “charity” 
in the form of “tribute” (kickbacks or subsidies) to 
leaders or pacification fees to communities for 
resources stolen and for other long-term harms, or 
to shovel funds to the “poor” for the fun of playing 
Santa Claus and for proselytizing the way of life of 
the givers, or simply giving money to a slogan (like 
“human rights”) for public relations purpose with 
an actual intent that the project achieve nothing 
more than transfer funds to those who mouth the 
slogan.  However, it is also possible to detect the 
same problems quickly through an inductive 
process that simply examines how a project is set up 
and where its internal processes are corrupted. 
 A properly managed sustainable development 
intervention will model sustainability, identify 
what has gone wrong, identify the underlying 
behaviors that need to be changed and their 
sequence and relationship to put the society back to 
sustainability (either after a disaster where relief is 
needed, or through a development intervention 
that rebalances consumption and production in an 
overall cultural system), fit inputs correctly to the 
problem, and then measure progress towards 
achieving that balance.  In five minutes, one can 
examine a project paper, identify if that is being 
done, and see, if it isn’t, what is being done in its 
place, that will quickly reveal how a project has 
been rigged (either consciously or subconsciously, 
even robotically) and what its real outcome will be. 
 In asking these seven questions by looking at 
the key sections of a project paper, problems (or 
hidden goals) can be quickly exposed. 
 
1. Project Goals and Objectives: Does the 
goals statement have a real link to 
sustainability (rebalancing) of cultures in 
their environments or is development just 
given as a euphemism not linked to these?   
(If sustainable development isn’t the real 
goal, this section can reveal the real goal or 
ideology of the project.)  If the focus is on 
“increasing productivity” or giving foreign 
technology to “relieve poverty” it is almost 
certain that the real purpose is to 
industrialize and break a local system for 
some reason of self-interest to the donor 
and a partner organization (extracting a 
resource, producing an export product, 
exploiting cheap labor, introducing 
consumption of foreign products, making 
the locals mimic the donor in consumption 
or gender relations or some other claimed 
“need” based on a difference).  If measures 
are in GDP or relative consumption 
(“poverty”) rather than sustainability, the 
project has been corrupted. 
 
2. Problem Statement:  Does the problem 
statement identify a chain of root causes 
and behaviors to be changed, or describe 
mechanisms for restoring losses and re-
establishing sustainability, or does the 
project simply treat symptoms and/or offer 
a fake (asserted) “problem” (in the eyes of 
the donor) requiring behavior change or 
transfers for another purpose?  If the focus 
is on “poverty” or “lack of … 
capacity/awareness/competence/informat
ion/foreign technology” is it clear that the 
problem statement has been written to 
support a pre-determined input rather 
than to solve a real development problem? 
 
3. Risks:  If there is a “risks” statement, does 
it list truly uncontrollable events beyond 
human behaviors or is it just a list of the 
actual problems that the project should 
address but the donor won’t touch 
(revealing the groups whose behaviors 
need to change but who are actually being 
bought off by the project)?  Typically, risk 
statements like “Leaders are not 
committed to … enforcing the law/ helping 
the poor/ promoting democracy/ etc.” or 
“The public won’t follow project 
recommendations,” reveal that the project 
has no intent to actually address the actors 
and behaviors that need to be changed to 
solve the problem and the project has a 
hidden motive.   
 
4. Inputs Linked to Root Causes:  Are each of 
the development inputs designed to change 
specific behaviors listed as part of a chain 
of root causes of unsustainability or are the 
inputs offered on their own, disconnected 
to the problem statement (thus, suggesting 
that the project is driven by the specific 
transfer itself as the real project goal)?  
Here, you can often reveal a corrupt project 
that is offering a specific payoff or trying to 
benefit a particular recipient.  The inputs 
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can identify either the beneficiary 
recipients or the insiders who are 
benefiting on the donor side from pushing 
a specific input, or both. 
 
5. “Stakeholders” versus Public Beneficiaries:  
Are citizen beneficiaries the primary 
stakeholders (the cultures and 
communities in the developing country and 
the funding public in developed countries) 
with government agencies and/or non-
profit organizations or businesses merely 
implementers subject to public control or 
have the implementing agents become the 
primary beneficiary group?  In a corrupted 
project, if the beneficiaries are listed as the 
implementing stakeholders like Ministries 
or government officials or “NGOs” it is 
almost always the case that the project is 
really seeking to buy influence rather than 
to promote development.  A simple 
question to ask here is whether the skill or 
benefit can be and is being given to every 
citizen through the existing education 
system, or whether real experts are going to 
be hired by the public to do what is needed, 
if the society or the institutions are missing 
some belief or skill.  If either of those 
approaches makes long-term sense and the 
project has not chosen this approach first, 
almost always the project is trying to buy 
off a particular group or to make the system 
dependent on perpetual support.  If it isn’t 
clear before, this reveals the recipient 
receiving a disguised payoff in a rigged 
project. 
 
6. Inputs Compared to Outputs and 
Outcomes (in a Logical Framework (Log-
Frame)):  Are inputs directly linked to root 
causes and designed to change behaviors or 
return a system to stability (after a disaster) 
or can they easily be described as “give-
aways” where the receipt of the input is the 
desired goal?  Outputs that are just 
rephrased inputs and not behavior changes 
are easy to spot in the list of “outcomes” in 
a project logframe.  They will be things like, 
“people attend conferences/training,” “X is 
built with the funds,” “awareness 
advertisements reach people.”  “Money-
shoveling” or “technology transfer” 
projects will have outputs such as “new 
hospital used,” “new computerized courts,” 
or “higher productivity from transferred 
technology and training” without any 
measure of how local funding makes the 
input sustainable or restores a cultural 
system to sustainability.  Secrecy clauses in 
the project document to hide public 
information from the public are also a 
quick give-away that something nefarious 
is at work between the donors and 
recipients. 
 
7. Project Rationale and Justification of 
Modality:  If there is a project rationale 
statement, does it explain both the purpose 
and the form of the intervention on the 
basis of restoring cultures and institutions 
after some event that disrupted them (such 
as colonialism) and helping to re-establish 
them as viable in ways that can be self-
supporting, that they are prevented from 
doing on their own as a result of outside 
pressures or disrupted belief systems, or 
does the project simply blame “poverty” 
and put the donor in the position of 
generous savior and benefactor to uplift the 
beneficiaries with the implication that they 
are “primitive,” hooking them on loans, 
subsidizing elites who could tax 
themselves, or subsidizing wasteful 
spending or consumption?  The real 
underlying question here is, “Why can’t the 
recipients solve their problems on their 
own?  What is stopping them other than 
“poverty”?  Why is a donor offering money 
and support and not the country’s elites or 
its business community or its own NGOs or 
its own people in a form of social 
organization, in ways that indicate self-
help, social solidarity, and autonomy?” If 
the project does not even ask this question 
and try to leverage self-help while also 
taking direct responsibility in addressing 
the root causes in developing countries of 
whatever problems the developed 
countries may have caused, this is already 
evidence of a hidden agenda.  That agenda 
can be revealed by asking what the project 
is not doing that it could be doing, within 
the donor countries or among elites in both 
donor and recipient countries. 
 
This indicator does not result in a score. It only 
raises suspicions and shows how projects are short-
circuited.  So, how can the information from this 
test result in change?  Confronting projects with the 
truth of what they are doing on the basis of this test 
is useful for public oversight (civil society, citizen 
media) but risky for individual consultants. 
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 The solution here is not only to expose what is 
going on, but to force the projects to follow the 
professional standard in these seven areas of 
project design.  Below in this piece is a discussion of 
a reworked log-frame for the U.N. system and E.C. 
that incorporates the requirement that a log-frame 
respond to these questions and puts back in what 
has been stripped from the frameworks in those 
organizations (and others like them) (Lempert, 
2016c). 
 
The Aggregate Results of the Essential 
Indicator Tools: What is Really 
Happening in Development and What 
Needs to Change  
 
How do different development organizations do 
when held to professional standards?  Actual scores 
using six of the indicators in some key areas where 
there are results for several organizations (overall 
professionalism of evaluation systems, sustainable 
development, dependency and capacity building, 
and two of the rights areas, democracy and 
democratic education) seem to prove development 
critics right.  Most of the major international 
organizations appear to be violating international 
laws and professionalism, substituting their own 
agendas in the name of “development.”  Since most 
NGOs rely on them for funding and for setting the 
agenda, many of these have also had their missions 
and oversight corrupted.  Best are NGOs that are 
self-financed and focused on their missions, with a 
professional commitment to sustainable 
development and international principles. 
 The tables here essentially confirm what 
previous articles for the two most basic indicators 
in the field – the one on “development” and on the 
pre-requisite for development, “poverty reduction” 
– suggested.  Almost none of the organizations 
working internationally were doing anything 
remotely related to development or poverty 
reduction with the exception of one or two 
independent NGOs that had set sustainability or 
cultural protection as their missions.  Indeed, we 
found the only real “development” and “poverty 
reduction” to be occurring in the donor countries 
themselves, in communities where there was some 
democratic control over spending and outcomes 
and where community members felt some 
solidarity with their neighbors.  But even that may 
be weakening in developed countries.  Here, we can 
test the results on some of the specifics, rather than 
just at the general level. 
 To confirm these results on the key areas for 
“development”, I have also recently tested the 
international community’s “Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs)” and its earlier 
“Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)” on 
development, sustainable development, and 
poverty reduction to show how the set of 
international development actors together, under 
the United Nations, international development 
banks (like the World Bank and regional banks) and 
international non-governmental organizations 
(INGOs) are also failing to uphold international 
laws and professionalism in these areas (Lempert, 
2017a). 
 The five tables below examine five different 
categories of organizations -- four types that work 
in the development field, with the final table 
offering organizational comparisons -- showing 
how they score on the six indicators that apply to 
them as organizations or to specific projects that 
are identified with those organizations.  (The two 
indicators that apply to specific categories – gender 
projects and sustainable business/market 
intervention projects – are not included in these 
tables given their limited applicability.)  The groups 
are:  multi-lateral organizations acting in 
development; country donors; civil society 
organizations of various types not including 
foundations; and foundations.  The comparisons 
are with domestic government agencies in 
developed countries and with business (for those 
categories where comparisons are possible). 
 In many cases, the indicator articles carefully 
scored a diverse range of organizations and those 
scores have simply been inserted into the tables 
below.  In other cases, new scoring is provided 
following the directions and calibrations used for 
the original scoring presented in those articles. 
 Note that in the table some scores are presented 
for the organization as a whole, looking at the 
aggregate of their mission, spending, and projects.  
For other organizations or for other indicators, a 
range is presented that applies to the variety of 
different projects that an organization runs.  For 
example, many international organizations run 
projects that empower women, which in some 
societies score as a positive democratic 
intervention, whereas in other places or in other 
types of projects, it may undermine cultures.  If the 
organization’s mission is haphazard and allows for 
these different results, or if a full analysis was not 
conducted, a range is presented here in place of a 
single score. 
 The organizations are presented in terms of 
spending in the area of “development.”  The results 
suggest that the larger the organization (from 
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international multi-lateral donors to country 
donors), the more they are motivated by self-
interest and actually undermine “development” 
and international treaties that they have signed or 
are the basis for their operations, at the very time 
they claim they are fulfilling them. 
 
World Bank, United Nations Organizations (Table 
1). Despite protests to the contrary, claiming that 
they have reformed and are now doing real 
development, the scoring of the World Bank (and 
similarly for other regional banks) demonstrates 
that they have little or no commitment to 
sustainable development or to independence of 
recipients, nor do they follow any of the principles 
of democracy or of professionalism.  The World 
Bank remains a bank promoting profits of donor 
countries.  Similarly, though it is not a bank, the 
United Nations shows a blatant disregard for its 
own international laws and treaties and for 
international standards.  U.N. organizations appear 
to have been co-opted by donors using it to serve 
their national interests with the U.N. as a lobbyist 
for hire and a servant of government elite interests 
rather than a protector of citizens to promote 
international agreed missions of sustainable 
development, democracy, human rights, diversity, 
or independence.  The data not only confirm that 
these organizations are substituting another 
agenda for development but it also makes clear that 
they are in violation of the very laws and 
professional doctrines they espouse, not merely in 
one area but systematically and across the board.  
They appear to be failing by design, using 
international laws as no more than lip service to 
justify missions that work to undermine 
international law, universal human values, and the 
future of our planet and species.  These 
organizations are outlaws.  Given the systematic 
failures, the question is not “improving” them but 
whether they can be brought under control of their 
own laws and reconstituted in a way that is law-
abiding.   In reviewing these results, it appears that 
the dependency theorists are correct in their 
critique that something in these organizations and 
in the global system has gone terribly wrong. 
 
Country Donor Organizations (Table 2). Though 
the long-term interest of every country is to adhere 
to universal human standards and law to protect 
diversity, independence, sustainability and 
sovereignty of the world’s 6,000 remaining, living 
cultures, and individual peoples, the indicator 
scores of donor country programs reveal that they 
almost universally place national, short-term, self-
interest of country elites and implementing agents 
over the interests of the planet or those of 
recipients.  Though they claim that the era of 
colonialism is something of the past, countries still 
appear to be using development as a cover for 
buying influence among recipient country elites 
and governments for resource extractions and 
product sales, with little change from the colonial 
past.  It is ironic that the only real success shown by 
the indicators (though it didn’t promote sustainable 
development) was the U.S. Marshall Plan to rebuild 
Western Europe after World War II.  It appears that 
it was only when the U.S. was rebuilding other 
developed countries to serve as allies in the Cold 
War, did it actually seek to apply most of the 
principles of development so that its allies would be 
strong and (mostly) independent. 
 
Non-Governmental and Civil Society 
Organizations (not including Foundations) (Table 
3). The variation in scores among NGOs reveals the 
large spectrum of civil society organization goals 
and performance.  These also seem to directly 
reflect their funding and support/oversight.  Some 
NGOs are clearly the models of sustainable 
development and professionalism, responding to 
universal humanitarian principles.  Others, seeking 
funding from governments or international 
organizations, have been corrupted by those 
agendas.  Missionary organizations largely begin 
with agendas that contradict the basis of 
development and promote the interests of donors 
and extension of their systems rather than the 
strengthening of diversity and sustainability in 
fulfilling principles of democracy and rights. 
 
Foundations (Table 4). Major international 
foundations also show mixed results when tested 
on the indicators.  Sometimes they act to promote 
democratization and may also introduce (partially) 
concepts and approaches to sustainable 
development, if that is their stated mission.  The key 
failing of foundations that the indicators reveal is 
they are also generally unaccountable to anyone 
other than themselves and they like to see 
beneficiaries dependant on their largesse rather 
than on a path to self-sustaining independence. 
 
Comparisons: Domestic Government in Developed 
Countries; Private Business (Table 5). Comparison 
scores of developed country governments and 
private businesses are presented to demonstrate 
that there are professional applications of 
evaluation systems in organizations where there is 
oversight from the direct beneficiaries (direct in 
business where the owners are defined as the 
beneficiaries, less direct but partly effective in 
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domestic government). The particular failure that 
occurs in development, and that these comparisons 
help reveal, is that the feedback and oversight links 
between beneficiaries and donor organizations are 
non-existent.  Meanwhile, most development 
organizations, whether they are government or 
private, are so far from taxpayers (and from citizens 
funding them) that there is also no real oversight to 
ensure compliance with international laws or with 
fulfillment of their missions.  Of course, both 
private business and governments in developed 
countries largely fail in sustainable development 
and in promoting democracy; indicating both the 
inability of business to protect societies without 
government oversight and the corruption of most 
contemporary governments when it comes to 
promoting equality and sustainability.  
 
Reflection on the Results: What Some 
Theory Tells us About Our World 
 
While it is comforting to have a set of tools for 
holding organizations to international laws and 
professional standards in the development field, 
the reality that most international organizations 
and countries demonstrate indifference to such 
standards is a cause for alarm for those of us who 
think beyond our own lifespan and are concerned 
about the future of the species and planet.  Leaders 
of the developed and developing world, and citizens 
in the developed world appear to have little concept 
of global stewardship and remain focused on short-
term interests and gains.  Given that countries have 
been able to agree on universal principles as long-
term goals, where is the logic in short-term actions 
that are self-destructive rather than on long-term 
solutions that are in everyone’s best interests?  Why 
can we not change our individual psychology or our 
cultural psychology?  Is there a way out? 
 Recently, a colleague and I sought to get to the 
bottom of some of this paradox by looking at 
behaviors of countries in regard to global warming, 
a recognized planetary problem, as well as to the 
behaviors of developed and developing countries 
where leaders have also put their systems on clear 
paths to unsustainability. 
 In the area of global warming, we found that 
behind the rhetoric of concern for the planet, 
developed countries were actually pursuing 
strategies in which they want global warming for 
the benefits it will bring them.  They appear to be 
hiding calculations on their short term interests 
(Lempert & Nguyen, 2009).  The same colleague 
recently completed a study of developed countries 
that are claimed to be sustainable in themselves, 
and found that the claims for sustainability in the 
development world are also mostly “hype.”  The 
reliance on consumerism (mass consumption) to 
promote hard work and to invest in and stimulate 
scientific productivity, still does not lead to a 
balance in which science can lead to enough 
productivity on existing resources to keep modern 
industrial systems sustainable. In other words, 
sustainability in the developed world with current 
levels of consumption is also a myth (Nguyen, 
2008). 
 Perhaps the best model of the apparent law-
breaking of international agreements and disregard 
for principles, occurring both in the developed and 
undeveloped world, is the political science game 
theoretical model of the “prisoners’ dilemma.”  
With sustainability a myth, individual nations and 
ethnic groups are the prisoners of a global 
competition to take scarce (or easily removable) 
resources.  Rather than protect their cultures and 
promote sustainability, they find, paradoxically, 
that the best means of “protecting” their resources 
is to overuse them now in ways that destroy their 
cultures and their potentials to be sustainable, so 
that they have the weaponry and wealth to protect 
their resources from those (more developed 
countries) who are scheming to take them.  What 
we have found is a paradox where the global system 
is actually undermining its own sustainability by 
destabilizing potentially sustainable systems 
(Lempert & Nguyen, 2011). 
 It seems that what has gone wrong, or remains 
at the root of the problem, is that we are unable to 
link sustainable development with concerns about 
security.  Whether it is in our nature or a result of 
memories of recent wars, or both, fears remain 
deeply embedded within leaders and mass publics 
that lead to aggrandizement and competition.  
Essentially there is collusion among leaders, and 
perhaps among all of us, for competition and 
mistrust that frustrates global standards.  We do 
not promote real development because in reality, 
no one really wants it.  If there is a need to change 
incentives, that means there is a need for an even 
firmer infrastructure for development to enforce 
long-term standards on developed and developed 
countries. 
 More recently, I have suggested that there may 
even be a logic at work of societal “suicide” 
(Lempert, 2017b). 
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Table 1  
How International Organizations Score on Compliance with International Law and on Professionalism: World Bank and United Nations Agencies 
Organization Evaluation Systems Score on 
basis of three categories:  
Management Control; 
Accountability; Professionalism 
Sustainable 
Development 
Score 
Dependency versus 
Autonomy/ 
Sustainability 
Score 
Capacity Building 
Score 
Democracy Promotion Score Democratic Education 
Promotion Score 
World Bank Corrupted:  (Low, Low, Low) Failure Dependency 
creating failure 
Corrupted, 
Incompetent, 
Hidden Agenda 
Project 
Unsustainable Quick Fix or Anti-
Democratic Failure, depending on 
project 
N.A. 
United 
Nations 
      
UNDP Corrupted:  (Low, Low, Low) Partial Solution Dependency 
creating failure 
Corrupted, 
Incompetent, 
Hidden Agenda 
Project 
Unsustainable Quick Fix or Anti-
Democratic Failure, depending on 
project 
 
Weak or partial (or 
questionable) solutions 
UNICEF Corrupted:  (Low, Low, 
Vulnerable) 
Failure Dependency 
creating failure 
N.A. Unsustainable Quick Fix or Anti-
Democratic Failure, depending on 
project 
 
Failure that appears to be 
proselytizing using “human 
rights” to promote a hidden 
agenda 
UN 
Volunteers 
Corrupted:  (Low, Low, 
Vulnerable 
Partial Solution Dependency 
creating failure 
[Generally follows 
UNDP] 
Range from Partly sustainable 
solutions that promote a specific 
group to Anti-Democratic 
Failures, depending on projects 
and group 
Failure that appears to be 
proselytizing using “human 
rights” to promote a hidden 
agenda 
UNCDF Corrupted:  (Low, Low, 
Vulnerable 
Failure Dependency 
creating failure 
Corrupted, 
Incompetent, 
Hidden Agenda 
Project 
Unsustainable Quick Fix or Anti-
Democratic Failure, depending on 
project 
N.A. 
UNHCHR Corrupted:  (Low, Low, 
Vulnerable 
Failure Dependency 
creating failure 
Corrupted, 
Incompetent, 
Hidden Agenda 
Project 
Unsustainable Quick Fix or Anti-
Democratic Failure, depending 
on project 
Failure that appears to be 
proselytizing using “human 
rights” to promote a hidden 
agenda 
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Table 2 
How Country Donor Organizations Score on Compliance with International Law and on Professionalism 
 
Organization Evaluation Systems Score 
on basis of three 
categories:  Management 
Control; Accountability; 
Professionalism 
Sustainable 
Development 
Score 
Dependency versus 
Autonomy/ 
Sustainability Score 
Capacity Building 
Score 
Democracy Promotion Score Democratic Education 
Promotion Score 
European Commission Corrupted:  (Low, Low, 
Low) 
Failure Dependency 
creating failure 
(capacity building; 
investment 
projects) 
Corrupted, 
Incompetent, 
Hidden Agenda 
Project 
Unsustainable Quick Fix or 
Anti-Democratic Failure, 
depending on project 
Failure that appears to be 
proselytizing using “human 
rights” to promote a hidden 
agenda 
USAID Corrupted: (Low, 
Vulnerable, Low) 
Failure Dependency 
creating failure 
Corrupted, 
Incompetent, 
Hidden Agenda 
Project 
Unsustainable Quick Fix or 
Anti-Democratic Failure, 
depending on project 
 
Failure that appears to be 
proselytizing using “human 
rights” to promote a hidden 
agenda 
U.S. Peace Corps [Assumed similar to USAID] Partial Solution Dependency 
creating failure 
Probably now 
similar to USAID 
but may vary by 
project 
Range from Partly sustainable 
solutions that promote a 
specific group to Anti-
Democratic Failures, 
depending on projects and 
group 
N.A. 
Japanese Aid [Not rated] Failure  Dependency 
creating failure 
Not tested but 
probably no 
different from 
USAID and EC 
Not a concern N.A. 
Chinese Aid Corrupted (Low, Low, Low) Failure Dependency 
creating failure 
Not tested but 
probably no 
different from 
USAID and EC 
Not a concern  N.A. 
Historical       
Marshall Plan in 
Europe 
[Historical.  Not rated] Partial Solution Positive model of 
independence 
Model  of 
comprehensive 
capacity building 
Model of comprehensive 
democratization 
[Historical.  Not rated] 
British, French 
Establishment of 
Administration 
Schools in Colonies 
[Historical.  Not rated] Partial Solution Dependency 
creating failure 
Minimally 
competent 
approach to 
capacity building 
Anti-Democratic Failure [Historical.  Not rated] 
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Table 3 
How Non-Governmental Civil Society Organizations Score on Compliance with International Law and on Professionalism 
 
Organization Evaluation Systems Score 
on basis of three 
categories:  Management 
Control; Accountability; 
Professionalism 
Sustainable Development 
Score 
Dependency versus 
Autonomy/ 
Sustainability Score 
Capacity Building 
Score 
Democracy 
Promotion Score 
Democratic Education 
Promotion Score 
International NGOs Corrupted:  (Low, Low, 
Low) 
Generally partial 
Solutions but also 
include models of 
sustainability 
Range from Positive 
Models of 
Independence to 
Dependency Creating 
Failures depending on 
organization’s 
mission and approach 
Large variation from 
corrupted, donor 
driven projects with 
hidden agendas to 
models of 
comprehensive 
capacity building 
depending on the 
NGO, clarity of its 
mission and 
safeguards 
Range from Partly 
sustainable 
solutions that 
promote a specific 
group to Anti-
Democratic Failures, 
depending on 
projects and group 
Range from a comprehensive 
approach to rights education 
and democratization 
(democratic experiential 
education approaches) to 
failures that are proselytizing 
and promote a hidden agenda 
Cultural Survival; Focus 
on Global South; 
Terralingua and other 
Minority Culture 
Empowerment 
[Not rated but assumed 
to follow pattern of 
Foundations or 
International NGOs] 
Model of sustainability Positive Model of 
Independence 
 
N.A. Partly sustainable 
solutions that 
promote specific 
groups 
N.A. 
Integrated and 
Sustainable Community 
Development Approach 
such as AFAP Project 
[Not rated but assumed 
to follow pattern of 
Foundations or 
International NGOs] 
Model of sustainability Positive Model of 
Independence 
 
Model  of 
comprehensive 
capacity building (with 
user groups) 
Partial solution N.A. 
Grameen Bank [Not rated but assumed 
to follow pattern of 
Foundations or 
International NGOs, 
though it may be partly 
effective in competency 
given its business 
measures] 
Potential model of 
sustainability 
Positive Model of 
Independence IF 
original model is 
followed, but colonial 
if it follows an export 
driven approach and 
subsidizes failed credit 
systems 
Model  of 
comprehensive 
capacity building 
Partial solution IF 
original model is 
followed but a 
Failure if it promotes 
consumption and 
resource exploitation 
without grass roots 
empowerment and 
sustainability 
N.A. 
Accion International 
and other kinds of SME 
[See above] Partial solution or failure 
depending on safeguards 
and assumptions 
Partial solution or 
failure depending on 
Narrow or Weak 
depending on 
commitment to “BDS” 
[See above] N.A. 
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Promotion and 
Development Projects 
safeguards and 
assumptions 
(business development 
services) approach 
WWF, IUCN, FFI 
alternative income or 
eco-tourism projects 
[Not rated but assumed 
to follow pattern of 
Foundations or 
International NGOs] 
Partial Solution Neutral N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Oxfam Prosperity 
Initiative, CARE and 
other relief 
organizations doing 
development 
[Not rated but assumed 
to follow pattern of 
Foundations or 
International NGOs] 
Failure Neutral or failures 
promoting 
dependency 
N.A. Unsustainable Quick 
Fix or Failure, 
depending on project 
N.A. 
Helvetas, SNV, CIDSE, 
Minority Area 
“Integrated 
Development” 
[Not rated but assumed 
to follow pattern of 
Foundations or 
International NGOs] 
Failure Promoting 
dependency 
Corrupted, 
Incompetent, Hidden 
Agenda Project 
Unsustainable Quick 
Fix or Failure, 
depending on project 
N.A. 
World Vision and 
Religious donors 
[Not rated but assumed 
to follow pattern of 
Foundations or 
International NGOs] 
Failure Dependency creating 
failure 
N.A. Failure Failure that appears to be 
proselytizing using “human 
rights” to promote a hidden 
agenda 
Street Law Civic 
Education Project; 
Transparency 
International; PIRGs; 
Common Cause 
[Not rated but assumed 
to follow pattern of 
Foundations or 
International NGOs] 
Partial solution Comprehensive 
Solution towards 
building an 
independent and 
sustainable system in 
line with international 
principles 
Model  of 
comprehensive 
capacity building 
Partly sustainable 
solutions that 
promote specific 
groups 
Strong and/or partly 
sustainable solution that 
promotes specific groups 
Domestic 
Empowerment NGO 
Approach (for 
comparison) 
      
Women’s rights 
movement in 
developed countries 
[Similarly, civil rights 
movement] 
- Partial solution  Partial Solution Model of 
comprehensive 
capacity building (but 
less when grafted into 
developing countries 
without considering 
cultural context) 
Partly sustainable 
solutions that 
promote specific 
groups 
Strong and/or partly 
sustainable solution that 
promotes specific groups 
University Service 
Learning Movement 
- Partial solution Partial Solution Corrupted, 
Incompetent, Hidden 
Agenda Project 
Unsustainable quick 
fix or failure 
Weak or partial (or 
questionable) solutions 
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Table 4 
How Foundations Score on Compliance with International Law and on Professionalism 
 
Organization Evaluation Systems Score 
on basis of three 
categories:  Management 
Control; Accountability; 
Professionalism  
Sustainable Development 
Score 
Dependency versus 
Autonomy/ 
Sustainability Score 
Capacity Building Score Democracy 
Promotion Score 
Democratic Education 
Promotion Score 
Major Foundations Corrupted:  (Low, Low, 
Potentially effective) 
Partial Solution Dependency creating 
failure 
Range from Narrow or 
Weak to Minimally 
Competent to potential 
Models if they fund 
basic skills and build 
institutions in ways that 
promote sustainability 
and full accountability 
Range from Partly 
sustainable solutions 
that promote a 
specific group to 
Anti-Democratic 
Failures, depending 
on projects and 
group 
Range from weak or 
partly questionable 
solutions to partly 
sustainable solutions 
that promote a specific 
group 
Soros Foundation [Not rated but assumed to 
follow pattern of 
Foundations or 
International NGOs] 
Partial Solution Dependency creating 
failure 
Minimally Competent 
approach to capacity 
building 
Range from Partly 
sustainable solutions 
that promote a 
specific group to 
Failures, depending 
on projects and group 
Range from weak or 
partly questionable 
solutions to partly 
sustainable solutions 
that promote a specific 
group 
Ford Foundation [Not rated but assumed to 
follow pattern of 
Foundations or 
International NGOs] 
Partial Solution Dependency creating 
failure 
Minimally Competent 
approach to capacity 
building 
Range from Partly 
sustainable solutions 
that promote a 
specific group to 
Failures, depending 
on projects and group 
[Not rated] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of MultiDisciplinary Evaluation  77 
 
 
Table 5 
How Domestic Government and Private Businesses Score on Professionalism 
 
Organization Evaluation Systems Score 
on basis of three 
categories:  Management 
Control; Accountability; 
Professionalism  
Sustainable Development 
Score 
Dependency versus 
Autonomy/ 
Sustainability Score 
Capacity Building 
Score 
Democracy 
Promotion Score 
Democratic Education 
Promotion Score 
U.S. Domestic Policy 
Departments 
Partly Effective (Partly 
Effective; Partly Effective; 
Partly Effective) 
Failure  N.A. N.A.  [Donor country 
governments do not 
build capacity of their 
own governments.] 
N.A. Failure that appears to 
be proselytizing using 
“human rights” and 
“democracy” to 
promote a hidden 
agenda 
Private Businesses Effective (Effective, 
Effective, Effective) 
Failure  N.A. N.A. [Indicator 
questions are designed 
for public purpose] 
N.A. N.A. 
   78 
 
 
Other Parts of the Infrastructure of 
Accountability in Development 
 
If leaders are unable to adhere to international 
agreements and professional standards, it is 
incumbent upon professionals to stand behind 
their ethics codes and professionalism rather than 
to stand idly by when such standards are stripped 
away.  Among the mechanisms to do that are for 
professionals to codify our work and require that 
anyone practicing in the field adhere to such 
standards, certification of simple tools like 
development logframes to assure that public 
organizations apply the standard practices, and 
professional contribution to monitoring 
organizations that highlight results.  This approach 
has partly worked in other fields but has not yet 
emerged in development.  At the same time, the 
standardization that donors are seeking may be of 
the type that “harmonizes” the politicization and 
undermining of professional standards.  Four types 
of tools that professionals can develop as part of the 
missing infrastructure, with concrete examples I 
have developed are as follows. 
 
Legal Tools to Hold Governments and NGOs to 
their Legal Missions 
 
Government agencies and Non-Governmental 
Organizations are, in theory, subject to laws on 
their operations.  Before even examining their 
specific activities in international development 
interventions, there are questions as to whether 
they are actually performing their legitimate 
functions under international law.  One can devise 
legal tests to hold them to these missions, both for 
governments (Lempert, 2016e) and NGOs 
(Lempert, 2016c).  
 
Certification and Unionization of Development 
Professionals to Uphold Professional Codes as 
Applied to Development, Even with Development 
Professionals Coming from Multiple Fields. There 
is no need for specific professional degrees in 
development and that may even be counter-
productive.  Lawyers building democracy, 
environmentalists working on sustainable 
development, doctors designing health projects, 
and others might actually find their standards 
eroded were they forced to train, instead, in 
“international development.”  Whatever the field 
professionals learn, what is important is that they 
are also held to specific codes of professionalism by 
their professions when they work on development 
projects.   
 It was my hope that consultants would 
unionize, starting with sub-fields, to protect their 
professionalism and to assure the public and donor 
agencies that those who were being hired were 
bound by the highest standards.  There already are 
ethics codes for lawyers, accountants, public 
managers, and a number of social sciences.  
Further, some professional specializations that 
train bureaucrats for the development field (the 
new degree programs in Development Studies or 
NGO management) could also seek to license or 
codify some aspects of the profession.  But they 
have not. 
 Some two decades ago, I began to work with 
existing ethics codes in a number of sub-fields.  I 
also then sought to enforce those codes against 
members who were in the development community 
in practice and wished to hold their licenses – 
lawyers working for the World Bank and violating 
codes, political scientists working for USAID, and 
so on.  I also sought to persuade these associations 
to create lists of organizational outlaws/violators 
and others praising best practices as a way to help 
monitor donor organizations (Lempert, 1997).   
 Thus far, without any public organization 
advocating for such codes or seeking sanctions 
against violators, there has been little progress in 
their use.  With no outside monitoring, major 
donors have been able to politicize hiring and firing 
of development practitioners (through mechanisms 
described and measured in the various indictors) 
and to undermine standards as well as attempts by 
professionals to unionize.  With more people in 
part-time or self-employed work who are struggling 
to survive, even those professions where there were 
clear standards – such as audits and accounting – 
have been easily corrupted in such huge contract 
areas as military spending, that no one pays any 
attention to violations of standards in aid.  
However, this approach merely awaits public 
enforcement pressure to become a reality. 
 
Required, Standardized Best Practice Tools such 
as Professional Project Logframes.  Some 
development tools are so universal that there is no 
excuse for not requiring that they be used in public 
spending in development and that professionals be 
subject to sanction and required to report on their 
non-use.  Although development organizations 
claim they need to be “flexible,” there are 
international laws and professional practices that 
are universally recognized as the basic standards of 
legality and competence.   
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 In another piece, I analyzed the failure of 
logframes and organizational administration in 
NGOs today and have redesigned the standard 
logframe to remedy the current failures (Lempert, 
2016c). 
 
NGO Monitoring of Development and Progress in 
Sustainable Development. While the failing 
development agents have no end of statistics on 
current incomes and lifestyles, they have yet to 
invest in any real indicator on internationally 
agreed end-goals for sustainability of the world’s 
cultures and communities.  Without any real idea of 
the point of progress and protections, the 
development agenda is left flailing.  While some 
environmental organizations can now tell us which 
eco-systems are failing and which species are going 
extinct, we have no similar measure of which 
human cultural systems are failing and going 
extinct (often as a result of failed development 
policies).  Recently, I have worked to invent the 
infrastructure for two such initiatives, in ways that 
closely follow the international law for cultural 
protections, in ways that link this protection to 
development; an initiative for a Red Book for 
Endangered cultures and a private sector 
“certification” scheme to certify products and 
services as benign (or toxic) in their impact on 
cultures.   
 My hope is that civil society will continue to 
generate organizations that are real monitors, 
including one that monitors all 6,000 of the world’s 
remaining human cultures in terms of their 
sustainability and whether they are threatened, 
endangered, critically endangered, or now extinct.  
Such a measure is also a means of generating legal 
standing for enforcement of protections and 
development in ways that comply with 
international genocide laws.  These are not the only 
such approaches.  The organization, Terralingua, is 
now developing better measures for biocultural/ 
linguistic diversity, though mostly of small groups 
still living in natural habitats.  Some of the excellent 
organizations mentioned in individual indicator 
articles as fulfilling missions – State of the World; 
IUCN’s Red Book of Endangered Species; can 
capture some of the overall issues on the level of 
eco-systems and human cultural systems that are 
the units for development.  We need to promote 
these measures rather than the false measures of 
“development” that are based on GDP (sales and 
productivity, based on what foreigners will pay for 
what a country has) rather than sustainability, 
cultural survival, and wealth/per capita assets 
(Lempert, 2010b). 
 
Larger System Changes Needed for 
Accountability and Transformation to 
Institutions that Follow the “Universal” 
Human Principles Over the Long Term:  
How to Use these Tools to Go Further   
 
Though these approaches above focus on 
professional tools, part of the obstacle to 
development is that we need to change our way of 
thinking about our world and about each other as 
much as we have to have the tools ready for life in 
such a world.  We cannot just create the legal and 
professional tools.  We also need to re-socialize 
ourselves and our young (recreating our culture in 
the developed world) and rebalance political 
interests for long-term survival.  Alongside legal 
reforms, I have set out with others in generating 
approaches to design those systems and to offer the 
measures and mechanisms for those as well, in 
books and articles for alternative sustainable 
development plans, for democratic-experiential 
education approaches throughout the social science 
curriculum, and for political and constitutional 
reform in the full design of alternative, workable, 
constitutional systems.  Much of this work that I 
have also presented in the form of legal solutions 
and solutions complementary to legal reforms has 
also been scholarly reviewed and published.  
However, since it has been published in a variety of 
disciplines, it has not been clearly linked as part of 
a single approach in development.  A brief review of 
the linkages and the complement to legal reforms s 
as follows: 
 
Alternative, Sustainable Development 
Planning 
 
If we are going to move towards sustainable 
development, we need to be able to develop plans to 
achieve it at the country level and at the level of each 
culture (and some communities) within a country.  
The reality is that the World Bank and other 
development banks, the UN and other development 
agencies approach countries as businesses to be 
used for increasing profitability and production, 
and their plans show no attempt to balance 
consumption with resources or to maintain cultural 
identity.  Some development textbooks introduce 
this critique, and anthropologists and 
environmentalists measure carrying capacity, but 
there are few models of how to actually do the 
planning.  In 1988, I organized a group of students 
to design an alternative plan for a small country; 
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Ecuador.  Though an early prototype with flaws, we 
presented it to the President of Ecuador and on 
national Ecuadorian television. We were then able 
to publish it as a textbook in alternative 
development planning, to demonstrate that it could 
be done and how (Lempert, Mitchell, & McCartney, 
1995).  
 
Building Democracy and Citizen Oversight 
through Redesigned Educational Systems:  
Democratic Experiential Education 
 
The ability to use indicators to hold governments 
accountable to laws and professionalism requires 
that universities and basic education train people in 
the skills that are required.  Educational systems 
today claim that the factory method of education 
training personnel for obedience in the workplaces 
of industrial society is the only efficient method of 
teaching skills with the existing resources.  As a 
university student, I tested that assumption by 
laying out the principles of education for skilled, 
empowered citizens who would learn everything in 
the basic curricula and then much more through 
experiential approaches and democratic forms of 
education.  Major universities accredited these 
courses that they found were not only more 
effective but were also cheaper than existing 
education.  I then formed an NGO to promote this 
approach and to spin-off the approach at the 
secondary school level and at the professional 
school level as well as internationally.  The tools for 
measuring educational systems and transforming 
curricula, with tested models at major universities, 
were published in a volume several years ago with 
the leading U.S. education publisher.  Since then, I 
have produced a sequel, for transforming 
professional schools globally, on the basis of 
consulting work done with universities on four 
continents (Lempert, Briggs, & Others, 1995).  
 
Remaking Constitutional Systems for a 
“Return to Democracy” and a “Return to 
Community”  
 
No real political progress appears possible in the 
developed world without restructured political 
systems that incorporate full citizen oversight 
mechanisms that protect individuals and 
communities from the arbitrary actions of the 
bureaucratic systems of military, police and 
economic power that have developed in modern 
times.  There are plenty of contemporary slogans 
and ideologies for such controls, but most of these 
mechanisms have failed.  My doctoral work in the 
Soviet Union during its transition, and several 
comparisons of major industrial societies (in the 
form of published books and articles, not cited 
here), examined the cultural and structural basis 
for these systems and where oversight mechanisms 
were stripped away, allowing systems to run 
themselves and to run amok.  In a trilogy of works 
on constitutional systems, I actually redesigned the 
U.S. constitution to take the cultural principles of 
oversight that existed in an agrarian, federal 
system, and to reapply them in modern forms in the 
industrial state.  The approach combines law, 
anthropology, political science and economics, and 
takes citizen powers like private attorneys general 
and jury oversight, for application in military, 
business, and government bureaucracies.  
Paradoxically, it fits no single discipline where 
there is a competence to review it, though 
colleagues have used it in teaching in places like 
Yale Law School.  One set of the proposals is 
presented briefly in a published piece several years 
ago showing how they could be applied in Ukraine 
(Lempert, 1994). 
 
Measuring Overall Progress  
 
We have the universal principles of U.N. treaties as 
a guide, but do we have any real measures of 
whether we are going forward and what it means 
beyond the simple measures of “development 
goals” that are part of the political checklists of the 
U.N.?  Along with a lack of tools for measuring the 
state of the world’s cultures in terms of sustainable 
development, we also seem out of measures (or 
interest) for determining whether we are even 
progressing anymore as a species.  Even if we have 
indicators for development of “broken” societies to 
repair them following a history of colonialism, an 
equally (or more) important question is whether we 
have any idea or measures of whether developed 
countries are achieving any real progress (other 
than scientific technological development) or 
whether we are regressing or stagnating.  Who is 
devising such measures?  Where can they be 
published?  Where are they heard?  Is “progress” 
even possible or are we locked into current 
patterns?  This is another debate that I have worked 
to reopen alongside the debates of legal 
accountability and reforms (Lempert, 2016f). 
 The paradox is that the thinking and skills do 
not exist for the transformations outlined above.  
Even so, if I and others can envision and build 
accountability tools and the infrastructure for 
promoting their use, that is proof that we have the 
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capacity to do so, even if our society currently lacks 
the will. If the capacity exists, the possibility exists 
that the goals can be realized at some future time.  
 
References 
 
Lempert, D. (1994). Ukraine's new constitution:  
Continuity under the banner of change with a 
proposal for authoritarian to democratic 
transitions. Demokratizatsiya, 2(2), 268 - 296. 
Retrieved from 
http://demokratizatsiya.pub/archives/02-
2_Lempert.pdf 
Lempert, D. (1996). Development and 
constitutional democracy: A set of principles 
for 'perfecting the market'. The Journal of 
Developing Societies, 36(1), 149 – 171.  
Lempert, D. (1997). Holding the powers that be 
accountable to our ethics code to protect our 
integrity and the peoples we serve. Human 
Rights, 24(2), 22 – 24. Retrieved from 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/a
ba/publishing/human_rights_magazine/irr_h
r_spring97_lempert.pdf 
Lempert, D. (2008). Forming a donor monitor 
NGO. Policy Innovations, (January 2008). 
Retrieved from  
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/polic
y_library/data/01464  
Lempert, D. (2009a). A dependency in 
development indicator for NGOs and 
international organizations. Global Jurist 9(2), 
1 - 40. 
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/gj.2009.9.
2/gj.2009.9.2.1296/gj.2009.9.2.1296.xml?for
mat=INT 
Lempert, D. (2009b). Why government and NGO 
projects fail despite ‘evaluations’:  An indicator 
to measure whether evaluation systems 
incorporate the rules of good governance.  
Journal of Multi-disciplinary Evaluation, 
6(13), 58 – 108. Retrieved from 
http://journals.sfu.ca/jmde/index.php/jmde_
1/article/view/243 
Lempert, D. (2010a). A human rights education 
project indicator for NGOs and international 
organizations. Interamerican Journal of 
Education for Democracy, 3(1), 46 – 72. 
Retrieved from 
https://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.p
hp/ried/article/view/617 
Lempert, D. (2010b). Why we need a cultural red 
book for endangered cultures, now. 
International Journal of Minority and Group 
Rights, 17(4), 511 – 550. Retrieved from 
http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/cont
ent/journals/10.1163/157181110x531420 
Lempert, D. (2011). A democracy building 
development project indicator for NGOs and 
international organizations. Global Jurist, 
11(2), 1 – 45. Retrieved from 
https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/gj.2011.11.
issue-2/1934-2640.1385/1934-2640.1385.xml 
Lempert, D. (2012).  A quick indicator of 
effectiveness of ‘income generation’ and 
‘sustainable business initiatives’ in 
international development. Economology 
Journal, 2(2), 28 – 90. Retrieved from  
https://www.vglobale.it/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/EJ_Y2V2.pdf 
Lempert, D. (2013a). Protecting endangered 
cultures from harms of globalization: A new 
product certification approach using business 
incentives. Practicing Anthropology, 35(1), 28 
- 32. Retrieved from 
http://www.sfaajournals.net/doi/abs/10.1773
0/praa.35.2.95j216k576828276 
Lempert, D. (2013b). Protecting endangered 
cultures from harms of globalization:  Where 
current public action and private product 
certification systems fail. Practicing 
Anthropology, 35(2), 23 - 27. Retrieved from 
http://www.sfaajournals.net/doi/abs/10.1773
0/praa.35.2.1784616t77gw8851 
Lempert, D. (2014a). Action plans, declarations, 
and other agenda setting documents in 
international development:  An indicator to 
assure professionalism. Momentum Quarterly, 
3(2), 58 – 74.  Retrieved from 
https://www.momentum-
quarterly.org/index.php/momentum/article/v
iew/77 
Lempert, D. (2014b). A Vision for Development and 
a Tool for International Comparisons. Journal 
for Economics and Social Policy, 16 (2), 1-34. 
Retrieved from 
https://epubs.scu.edu.au/jesp/vol16/iss2/3/ 
Lempert, D. (2015a). A poverty reduction 
accountability indicator for international 
organizations and NGOs. Law, Social Justice 
and Global Development, 2015(1), 1-31. 
Retrieved from 
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/20
15-1/lempert/lembert.pdf 
Lempert, D. (2015b). A quick indicator of 
effectiveness of ‘capacity building projects’ of 
NGOS and international organizations. 
European Journal of Government and 
Economics, 4(2), 155 – 196. Retrieved from 
https://www.ejge.org/index.php/ejge/article/
view/63 
82    Lempert 
 
 
Lempert, D. (2016a). An accountability indicator 
for gender equality projects of NGOs and 
international organizations. Journal of Human 
Rights in the Commonwealth, 2(2), 32 – 49. 
Retrieved from 
http://sasojs.da.ulcc.ac.uk/jhrc/article/view/2
263 
Lempert, D. (2016b). A decentralization in 
governance project screening indicator for 
NGOs and international organizations. 
Transcience: Journal of Global Studies, 7(1), 1 
– 35. Retrieved from http://www2.hu-
berlin.de/transcience/vol7_no1_1_35.pdf 
Lempert, D. (2016c). A screening indicator for 
holding non-governmental organizations to 
standards of professionalism and 
accountability. Journal of Social Research and 
Policy, 7(1), 1 – 29. Retrieved from 
http://www.jsrp.ro/content/JSRP_Vol7_Iss1
_Lempert 
Lempert, D. (2016d).  A sustainable (culture 
protecting) tourism indicator for government 
supported cultural and environmental heritage 
tourism initiatives. Asian Journal of Tourism 
Research, 1(2), 103 – 147. Retrieved from 
https://asiantourismresearch.cmu.ac.th/Vol1
%20No.2/Chapter4.pdf 
Lempert, D. (2016e). Distinguishing development 
agencies from colonial bureaus exercising soft 
power: Reforming imperial economics and its 
administration. Journal of Globalization 
Studies, 7(1), 87-111. Retrieved from 
https://www.sociostudies.org/journal/files/jo
gs/2016_1/Lempert%20Full%20version.pdf 
Lempert, D. (2016f). The myth of social progress, 
revisited. Human Figurations:  Long Term 
Perspectives,  5(1). Retrieved from 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/h/humfig/1121760
7.0005.107/--myth-of-social-progress-
revisited?rgn=main;view=fulltext 
Lempert, D. (2017a). Testing the global 
community’s Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) against professional standards and 
international law. Consilience: The Journal of 
Sustainable Development, 18(2), 111 – 174. 
Retrieved from 
https://consiliencejournal.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/25/2017/06/Lempert_
SDGs_Final-1.pdf 
Lempert, D. (2017b). The logic of cultural suicide 
and application to contemporary 
environmental strategies:  Drawing from 
models in psychology and biology. Journal of 
Globalization Studies, 8(1), 120 – 139. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.sociostudies.org/journal/articles
/939397/ 
Lempert, D. (2018a). A treatise on international 
development law. DePaul Journal for Social 
Justice, 11(1), 1 – 38. Retrieved from 
https://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewconten
t.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1152&con
text=jsj 
Lempert, D. (2018b). Escape from Professional 
Schools (unpublished, available from author). 
Lempert, D., Briggs, X. & Others. (1995). From the 
ivory tower:  Student adventures in 
democratic experiential education. Jossey-
Bass Inc. Publishers/Simon & Schuster. 
Lempert, D., Mitchell, C. & McCarty, K. (1995). A 
model development plan:  New ideas, new 
strategies, new perspectives. Westport, CT:  
Praeger Publishers/Greenwood Press. 
Lempert, D. & Nguyen, H. N. (2008). A sustainable 
development indicator for NGOs and 
international organizations. International 
Journal of Sustainable Societies, 1(1), 44-54. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.inderscienceonline.com/doi/pdf
/10.1504/IJSSoc.2008.020376 
Lempert, D. & Nguyen, H. N. (2009). A convenient 
truth about global warming:  Why most of the 
major powers really want global warming. The 
Ecologist, 39(1), 62. Retrieved from  
http://www.theecologist.org/pages/archive_d
etail.asp?content_id=2112  
Lempert, D. & Nguyen, H. N. (2011). The global 
prisoners’ dilemma of unsustainability: Why 
sustainable development cannot be achieved 
without resource security and eliminating the 
legacies of colonialism. Sustainability:  
Science, Practice and Policy, 7(1),  16 – 30. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/28
9813355_The_global_prisoners%27_dilemma
_of_unsustainability_Why_sustainable_devel
opment_cannot_be_achieved_without_resou
rce_security_and_eliminating_the_legacies_
of_colonialism 
Lempert, D. & Nguyen, H. N. (2017). Accounting for 
threats to sustainable development:  An 
indicator for holding NGOs and international 
organizations accountable to creating the 
context for sustainable development. 
Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable 
Development, 17(1), 220-246.  Retrieved from 
https://consiliencejournal.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/25/2017/02/493-1438-
1-PB.pdf 
Nguyen, H. N. (2008). Toxic omissions and 
cancerous growths: Addressing the 
Journal of MultiDisciplinary Evaluation  83 
 
 
unexamined assumption of sustainable 
consumption in technologically innovative 
societies. (Master’s thesis). Department of 
Environmental Policy, Central European 
University. Retrieved from 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/27
825573_Toxic_Omissions_and_Cancerous_G
rowths_Addressing_the_Unexamined_Assum
ption_of_Sustainable_Consumption_in_Tech
nologically_Innovative_Societies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
